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ABSTRACT

research indicates that anti-social action
Charmlnp- or refusing- to help another human
being) may
lead to subsequent compensatory or reparative
action,
ihe research also suggests that the source
of the
psycholog4.cal stress which typically follows anti-social
behavior may be a decrease in one’s opinion of himself
C self-concept )
The individual is then prone to engage
in pro-social behavior (helping or refusing to injure
another human being) which raises the self-concept back
to its chronic level.
.

An analysis of the rewards and costs which determine
an Individual’s chronic self-concept level suggests the
possibility that each individual functions at an optimal
s^lf'”Concept level at which his outcome (rev;ards minus
costs) is at a maximuri.
The individual strives to maintain this chronic self-concept level thus maximizing his
outcomes.
Such a homeostatic mechanism has an important
i implication
If the self-concept is shifted, the individual may be predisposed to engage in behavior which will
restore the self-concept to its chronic level.
.

The present research investigated the relationship
betv/een the benevolence dimension of the self-concept
and pro-social and anti-social behavior.
In line with
the hypothesized homieostatic mechanism, the following

hypotheses were tested:
1.

Pro-social action which results in a positive
displacement along the benevolence dimension of
the self-concept predisposes an Individual to
engage in anti-social behavior which has the
aim. of lowering the self-concept to its chronic
level

2.

Anti-social action which results in a negative
displacement along the benevolence dimension of
the self-concept predisposes an individual to
engage in pro-social action whichlr\as the aim
of raising the self-concept to its chronic level.

One third (60) of the subjects helped a crippled
female student (a hired actr-ess) carry a stack of books
down a flight of stairs and out to a parking lot (proAnother third of the subjects
social manipulation).
were prevented by the experimenter from complying with
the actress’ request (anti-social manipulation). The final

bird wore not exposed to any self-concept
manipulation
(controls).
Following this manipulation, the subjects
were afforded an opportunity to administer either
shock
(anti-social dependent variable), money (pro-social
dependent variable), or lifht (neutral dependent
variable) to a (fictitious) experimenter's assistant.
A self-concept test was then administered.

Hypothesis 1 was supported. The pro-social nanipulation resulted in a rise of the self-concept level which
led to anti-social action in the form of the administration of shock. This anti-social activity restored the
self— concept to its chronic level. The pro— social manipulation had no sipnlficant effect on subsequent pro-social
behavior.
Support was also found for Hypothesis 2. The antisocial manipulation resulted in a lowering of the selfconcept level which increased the propensity to engage
in pro-social action which took the form of the
administration of reward. As predicted, the rewardgiving behavior raised the self-concept back to the
chronic level.
The anti-social manipulation had no
significant effect on subsequent anti-social behavior.
The

i

along with

iTplications of the findings were discussed
suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Overview

There exists in American society a norm of benevolence:

a culturally shared standard of conduct which

dictates that an individual should be ready and willing
to help a fellow man in need, and also refrain from

committing acts injurious to his fellow man.
research is concerned with behaviors

The present

v;hich represent

deviations from, or adherence to, the benevolence norm.
Deviations from; the norm will be termed anti-social
behavior, while behaviors which represent adherence to
the benevolence norm will be labelled pro-soc ial

.

An analysis of what theorists and researchers have

identified as the advantages (rewards) and the disadvantages (costs) of engaging in anti-social activity leads
to the expectation that

m.an

adhere to the benevolence

should be highly prone to

norm..

However, mass media,

everyday observation, and em.pirical evidence all indicate
that the benevolence norm is often violated.

One way to

would
account for a prevalence of anti-social behavior

engaging in
be to identify a potent, latent reward for
of
such behavior, or to identify a latent cost

2

en^g^ing in pro-social behavior.
A latent reward for engaging
in anti-social behavior

can be deduced from a review of research
concerned with
the alleviation of post-aggression
psychological stress.

The research suggests that anti-social
behavior generally

results in a loss of self-esteem and that
justification
and compensation, the two most common responses of
a

harm-doer to his deed,

both operate in the service

m.ay

of the maintenance of self-esteem.

lowers the self-concept

,

i

.

e

.

,

An aggressive action

there is a decrease in

feelings of self-worth and self-respect, and the justi-

fication or corrpensation raises the self-concept back to
its normal level.

If one assumes that an individual

strives to maintain this normal self-concept level, a
rise in the self-concept may lead to anti-social action
v/hich has the

aim of restoring the self-concept to its

normal level just as a lowering of the self-concept
leads to compensatory action which raises the self-

concept to its normal level.

The restoration of an

elevated self-concept back to its normal level may constutute a potent, latent reward for engaging in antisocial action.

Inadequacy of Current Theory

Because aggression may constitute

a prevalent

mode

3

of anti-social activity, perhaps

sorre

theory of ap-fressive

behavior will suffice to explain the dynamics of antisocial behavior.

Aggression is typically defined as the

/

deliverance of a noxious stimulus and therefore theories
of aggression direct themselves to instances in v;hich
one person delivers a noxious stimulus to another person.

Violations of the benevolence norm however, need not
involve the deliverance of a noxious stimulus.

Failing

to help another human being who is in dire need is a

violatjon of the benevolence norm, and is therefore defined
as anti-social but cannot be accurately labelled "aggres-

sive" since no noxious stimulus is delivered.

Thus, much

anti-social activity cannot be accounted for in terms of
theories of aggression simply because such theories are

restricted by their definition of aggressive behavior.
Another shortcomilng of theories of aggression is
that they address themselves only to aggression which is

preceded by frustration and hence they do not attempt to
account for instrumiental aggression, "behavior primarily

oriented toward the attainment of some goal other than

doing injury (Berkowltz, 19^2, p.31)»"

Many anti-social

acts are not preceded by frustration and are not primarily

directed toward doing injury.

Berkowltz cites several

to
examples of instrum.ental aggression which, according

anti-social
the present analysis, are also instances of

4

action:

killing a military enemy in an effort to
win
war; spreading vicious lies about a political
rival

a

in

an effort to win an election.

Theories of aggression do

not address themselves to such phenomena.

It

is the

prevalence and significance of such anti-social phenomena
coupled with the lack of research and theory to account

adequately for such phenomena which has provided the
impetus for the present research.

Identifying the Rev;ards and Costs
of Anti-Social. Behavior
The model presented in this paper is derived from a

reward-cost natrix associated with every situation in
which an individual must decide whether to engage in
form of anti-social behavior.
a

som.e

The decision is based upon

comparison of the anticipated rewards and costs asso-

ciated with each of the two alternatives.

The chosen

alternative will be that one which results in the highest
outcome, i.e., the one in which the anticipated rewards
minus the anticipated costs is greatest.

This approach,

in its utilization of a reward-cost matrix, is very

similar to the "exchange theory" approach of Thibaut and
Kelley (1959).

The principal difference is that exchange

theory is primarily concerned with the formation and

maintenance of interpersonal relationships while the
present approach utilizes the reward-cost matrix to

5

analyze the decision-makinp process involved
in antisocial and pro-social action.
The anticipated rewards associated with the
decision
to enpage in anti-social action depend upon the
situation
in question.

For example, the reward for eng;aplnp in

military com.bat nay be the preservation of one’s ovm life
or victory for one's allies.

lead to social betterment.

Engaging in race riots nay
Stealing may result in an

increase in material gains.

victory in an election.

Spreading lies may lead to

There are instances however, in

v/hich individuals choose not to take part in anti-social

activity.

There are draftees who refuse to kill, Negroes

who abstain from race riots, people who v/ould not steal
if they v/ere on the brink of starvation.

Such instances

of abstinence suggest that, under some conditions, the

anticipated costs associated

v/ith the

decision to engage

in anti-social behavior are high relative to the antici-

pated rewards.

Such anticipated costs, vfhich tend to

inhibit anti-social behavior, include physical punishment
(Seward, 19^*6; VJhiting and Child, 1953), interference

with the attainment of some goal (Zander, 1958), and
verbal reprimand from an authority figure (Cohen, 1955).
A potent

additional cost of engaging in anti-social action

is cited by Berkowitz (1962).

"The strength of an indi-

vidual's aggressive tendencies is directly associated
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with the intensity of the arrression
anxiety subsequently
aroused in him to the extent that he
anticipates punishment or disapproval for app-ression

If the individual

is instipated to action that ho knows
is a serious depar-

ture from his behavioral standards,

faiilt

would be antici-

pated and this could prevent the action from occurrinp
(p*93)."

Further, it seems reasonable to assume that

this anticipated cost (psycholopical discom.fort) will

vary directly with the mapnitude of harm to the potential

victim since the perpetrator should penerally expect preat
psycholopical discomfort followinp severe harm.-doinp and
only minor puilt followinp acts which result In relatively

little harm.
An e jq-icrlm-ental situation in which inaction constututes

anti -social behavior can be used to illustrate the reward-

cost matrix.

In a study by Lerner and Sim.mons

(

1966),

subjects observed a peer who was part icipatinp in

learninp

e jq'ieri rent

.

verbal

a

Pivery time the peer responded

incorrectly, she received what appeared to be

a very

painful electric shock (actually, no shock was administered).

All subjects viewed this performance for a 10-

minute period.

Accordinp to the present author, anti-

social behavior consists of passive observation by

a

subject while pro-social behavior consists of objection
to the procedure on behalf of the learner.

The reward-
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cost matrix associated with the
two possible alternative

behaviors in the above situation is
illustrated in Figure
Similar matrices can be projected for all
situations

1

in

which an individual must decide whether to
enp-ape in some
mode of anti-social behavior.

REWARD

COST
^

ANTISOCIAL

1

Avoidance of potential
censure by an authority fipure.
Guarantee
of experimental credit

Psychological discomfort
associated with passively watchinp someone
undergo extreme pain.

or m.oney.

PROSOCIAL

Avoidance of psychological discomfort associated v/lth passively
v/atchinp someone
undergo extreme pain.
Possible positive
feeling- of humaneness.

Potential censure by an
authority figure. Potential loss of experimental credit or money.

The reward-cost matrix associated
Fip.l.
with a decision of whethier to enp'ag'e in
anti-social or pro-social behavior.

8

Predicting from the Reward-Cost Matrix
Two experimental studies will be cited in
order to
see whether the predictions generated from the
rewardcost matrix are borne out.

Of the rewards and costs thus

far cited, those relevant to each experimental study
will
be considered.

In a study by Milgram (1963), subjects,

playing the role of teacher, were told by the experimenter
to administer electric shock to another subject (the

learner) each tine the learner responded with an incorrect
answer.

For each incorrect answer, the teacher was

instructed to raise the intensity of shock.
actually given as the learner

v;as

No shock was

an experimental stooge.

As the procedure pro gressed and the shock level increased,
’

the teacher received feedback fromi the learner which

indicated that the learner was undergoing excruciating
pain.

The teacher’s cost (psychological disco nfort

)

of

continuing to shock the learner was extremely high.
Indeed, Milgram reports

th.at

subjects broke out into a

cold sweat, laughed uncontrollably

into their skin.

,

and dug their nails

The cost of engaging in pro-social

behavior (refusing to continue administering the shocks)
was possible censure by the experimenter for not obeying
his orders and possibly ruining the e>periment.
0xtj’0ifi0ly hJ gh

The

cost of continuing the anti— social activity

corrpared to what appears to the lesser cost of ceasing

9

the anti-social activity leads to
the prediction that
many of the subjects would have refused
to continue

administering the shocks.
out.

This prediction is not borne

Although some subjects refused to continue, the

najority of subjects continued administering the
shock

until the final shock lever had been pulled.
The finding that the majority of subjects do continue

administering the shock might indicate that the cost of
pro-social action in this experimental situation

more

is

than sufficient to offset the cost of anti-social action.
Yet, it is difficult to accept such an explanation

v;hen

one realizes that conplying with the experimenter’s

requests results in such severe, if not lethal, doses of
shock to the learner.
A

similar situation in which subjects were asked to

cause harm to another human being can be found in
by Glass (196^1).

a study

In this study, subjects who were on

record as being either somewhat opposed or extremely

opposed to the use of electric shock on humans for scientific purposes were given the option of whether or not
to take part in an experiment in which they would be

required to administer shock to another subject;
The anticipated high cost (psychological discomfort)
of taking part in an activity which is contrary to one’s

stated behavior standards, coupled with what would appear

.
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to be a snail cost (based
upon the elaborate option)
of
refuoing to administer the
shock, leads to the prediction
that many of the subjects
would sinply take their leave
and avoid the distasteful
activity.
Of the 62 subjects
given the shock option, 60 chose
to remain and administer
the shock.
Glass does not attempt to interpret
this

surprising finding as the research was
prinarily directed
toward the investigation of
post-aggression
dissonance

reduction
Ihe findings fromi the experiments cited
above,

together with the high frequency of anti-social
behavior

encountered in everyday living, might lead one to
believe
thao causing harm, to another human being does not
result
xn any psychological discomifort to the harm-doer and

hence, thei’e is little or no deterrent to causing

Studies by Milgram (I963), Glass
Sim.mons (I966).

(

1964

),

harmi.

Lerner and

and Darlington and Macker (I966), have

shown that harmi-doing does, in fact, result in psychological stress to the harn-doer.
som;e

As noted earlier, in

cases this stress is so severe that the harm.-doer

might dig his nails into his skin, break into a cold sv/eat,
or even convulse.

The fact that people are so willing

to risk the possibility of such unpleasant aftereffects

of anti-social behavior suggests that either there is some
higji

cost of pro-social behavior or some high reward
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value of anti-social behavior
which has not been taken
into account in the reward-cost
matrix.
Further, this
as yet unspecified reward or
cost coupled with the other

rewards and costs inherent in the situation
must, in the
majority of instances, outweigh the
psychological discomfort following the anti-social act in order
for
it to

account for man’s propensity to engage in such
behavior.

Anti-Social Behavior and the Self-Concept
In an article concerned with the motivational fac-

tors involved in the resolution of decisional conflicts,

Janls (1959) asserts that acts v;hich are violations of
one’s moral code are typically followed by a loss of

self-esteem.

Empirical support for this assertion is

provided by a series of studies by Pepitone

(

1964

).

After causing harm to other individuals by being overly
punitive, subjects filled out an extensive series of

questionnaires tapping such variables as rationalization,
self-criticism, self- justification
etc.

,

self-equivocation,

Based upon analyses of these data, Pepitone con-

cluded that justification and compensation, the two most
comm.on responses elicited by the subjects, may both

operate in the service of the maintenance of self-esteem.
The results of several other experiments are compatible with the assertion that a lowering of the self-
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concept is the primary source
of psychological stress
following anti-social behavior.
Davis and Jones (i960),
Buss ( 1961 ), Berkowltz
(1962), and Glass (196H) all
found
that subjects, after causing
harm to another human being,
tended to reject and devalue
their victim. Lerner and
Simmons (1966) found the same
effect when subjects merely
observed another subject receiving
shook from an experimenter.
Lerner and Simmons interpret their
results in
light of a "Just world hypothesis" which
states that

people need to believe in a Just world.

An Implication

of this hypothesis is that when someone
receives unjustified pain, subjects reject and devalue him
because it is

Justifiable to cause pain to an inferior
Although the "Just world hypothesis"

beirif^.
niay

be valid,

there is an alternative interpretation of the Lerner and

Simmons results.

By rejecting and devaluing the victim,

one not only rakes the victim inferior, but also makes

himself relatively superior.

Because subjects were not

asked to rate non-victims following the anti-social act,
there is no way to determine whether the objective of the

denigration response was solely to make the victim inferior
or whether the denigration response was utilized to make

the harm-*doer relatively superior.

Self-enhancement need

not be accomplished through a denigration process; however,
this mode nay have been made most salient by the
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experimental procedure which
javo subjects the
opportunity
to evaluate their victims
immediately following the
antisocial act.
A study by Darlington
and Macker (1966)

illustrates a

behavioral response to one’s
own aggressive behavior.
this study, subjects in an
experimental

In

group were led to

believe that they had caused
harm to another human being.
Control subjects were given no
such belief.
Analysis of
subsequent behavior revealed that
the experimental

subjects

were significantly more willing to
donate blood to a local
hospital than were the control subjects.
If the experimental subjects in this study felt less
worthy following their

anti-social behavior, the blood-donating act
would tend to
relieve their psychological discomfort by
raising

their self-

concepts.

Similarly, the subjects in the Lerner and Simmons

(1966) study may have been exhibiting a similar response;
the

subjects enhanced their self-worth by denigpfating

their victims.
There are several studies (for example, Berscheid
and Walster, I967) that show that harm-doers will attempt
to compensate their victims if an opportunity for compen-

sation exists.

It is possible to view such compensatory

behavior as an attempt on the part of the harm-doer to
repair a damaged self-concept by reaffirming his own
worthiness.

The anti-social act lowers the self-concept

;

1^1

and the compensatory or reparative
act raises the self
concept back to its normal level.
The Nature of the Self-Concept
A typical definition of "self-concept"
is provided

by Rogers (1951):

"The self-concept or self-structure

may be thought of as an organized configuration
of percep-

tions of the self which are admissible to awareness.

It

is coirposed of such elements as the perceptions of
one’s

characteristics and abilities; the percepts and concepts
of the self in relation to others and to the environm.ent
the value qualities which are perceived as associated with

experiences and objects; and goals and ideals which
are percieved as having positive or negative valence
(p.

136)."
As this definition suggests, the self-concept is

conposed of one’s perceptions of many different characteristics of himself.

Som.e

of these characteristics are

evaluative in that the individual judges himself in

relation to some affectively-laden characteristic, e.g.,
"I am very honest and a person should be this honest,"
"I

am not very intelligent and one should be very intelOther characteristics may not have any evaluations

ligent."

attached to them, e.g., "I have black hair,
.eyes."

It

I

have blue

is important to note that there are two

.
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judgements involved when one considers characteristics

which are subject to self-evaluation.

First, the

individual judges his position (level) along the relevant
dimension, e.g.
honest.

,

"I am fairly intelligent,

I

ami vei’y

Second, he judges the value of the characteristic,

e.g. ."It is very good to be intelligent, it is not important

to be honest."

The present research is concerned with the

benevolence dimension of the self-concept and two assumptions regarding benevolence are made.

First, since bene-

volence represents adherence to a norm, the assunption is
made that people view benevolence as a positive or desirable

trait.

Second, individual differences in the importance

of this dimension are randomly distributed among any given

population

According to the present analysis, the chronic level
of the self-concept is governed by reward-cost matrices

along the various dimensions.

Adhering to the maximum

outcome concept cited earlier, the chronic level of an

individual’s self-concept is that point at which his
outcome (the rewards associated with that level of the

self-concept ninus the costs he must incur to maintain
that sel f-coiicept level) is at a maximum.

Rewards and costs relevant to the benevolence dimension of the self-concept are illustrated in the following

example.

Consider an individual who desires to maintain
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a hi£iily positive self-concept
along the benevolence

dirnension.

Such an individual must engage in
benevolent

activity which would undoubtedly require
a sacrifice of
time and/or money. He must also refrain
from comritting
acts which society might lable "malevolent."

These are

specific costs which one nust incur if he wishes to
think
of himself as highly benevolent.

The rewards associated

with the self-concept of high benevolence are the gratl-

fying feelings of self-worth and self-respect, and the
praise, respect, and gratitude of other people.

Individual differences in the weighting of relevant
rewards and costs account for individual differences in
chronic self-concept levels.

Such differences in weight-

ing are a function of the actual behavior of the individual
and his evaluation of his behavior.

The actual behavior

of the individual is governed both by intrinsic and

extrinsic factors.

Intrinsic factors include an individ-

ual's self-concept along dimensions other than the one
in question and_, his evaluation of the relevant dimension.

Extrinsic factors include income, vocation, physique, etc.
The benevolence dimension of the self-concept may
be affected by other dimensions of the self-concept in

that a low self-concept along such dimensions as intelligence or competence tends to inhibit benevolent activity
by making benevolent activity extremely costly. For

.
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exarrple, one

nay hesitate to volunteer for
hospital work

because he feels he is not intelligent
enouj-h to Interact
effectively with the patients. Similarly,

one may refuse

to Join the volunteer fire department
because he thinks
he would prove incompetent.

For this individual, the

cost of engaging in benevolent activity would be
prohibi-

tive and hence, he chooses to maintain

a

relatively low

level of benevolence which represents his maximum outcome
level

Generally

,

the more an individual values a dimension

of the self-concept, the more motivated he will be to

maintain a high level of that dimension.

Consider an

individual who places an extremely high value on knowledge.
In order to maintain a high level of knowledge, he spends

five hours every day reading books.

Although five hours

per day may seem like a great expenditure of time, it is
more than compensated for by the rewards the individual

experiences as

a i*esult of his knowledge.

These rewards

Include feelings of self-worth and self-respect as well
as the praise and respect of other people.

An individual

who did not place a high value on knowledge would nob be

expected to incur the cost of reading time since the
rewards he would experience because of his knowledge

would be negligible.

He would not be expected to experi-

ence feelings of self-worth or self-respect since he
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attaches little value to knowledge.

Extrinsic factors which

iray

regulate an Individual's

benevolent activity do so by determining
how costly a
particular sacrifice will be. People in
low income

brackets may not be able to afford to
donate any money
to charity and this may result in a
relatively

low self-

concept of benevolence.

A

similar situation exists for

the man who works sixteen hours a day and
therefore

cannot become

a

Boy Scout leader, or the ninety pound

weakling who is unable to donate blood.
Different people evaluate identical behaviors in
different ways.

Such differences in evaluations can affect

the self-concept in that the individual may or may not

consider a given act to be relevant to the dimension in
question.

Consider a volunteer hospital worker who per-

ceives his volunteer work as highly humanistic, highly

self-sacrificial, and generally, above and beyond the
cal],

of duty.

This percept enhances feelings of self-

worth which, according to the present analysis, is
rewarding.

It

is also possible that an individual views

his volunteer work simply as a fulfillment of one's obli-

gation to society.

Such a percept is not likely to lead

to an enhancement of one's feelings about his worthiness.

The volunteer work is therefore not acconpanied by

hifii

reward value and hence the self-concept of this individual

.
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is not hi(jily positive even though he
engages in altruistic

activity
It

is possible to shift the self-concept level
by

nanipulating relevant rewards.

For exanple, one

be

r'ay

so dissatisfied with his self-concept that he undergoes

therapy in an effort to raise it.

Consider the volunteer

hospital w'orker who views his work as sirrply paying
debt to society.

a

He is incurring costs in the form of

the time and the effort he expends at his job yet his

rewards are negligible because there is little or no

gratifying feeling which acconpanies his work.

undergoing therapy, he

viev\rs

his volunteer hospital work

as higjily humanistic and altruistic.
a gi'atifying

After

He now experiences

feeling from his work and thus, his rewards

are increased.

His outcome (rewards minus costs) is also

Increased and his self-concept along the benevolence

dimension rises to a new level.

It is inportant to note

that both before and after therapy, his self-concept was
at that point where his outcome was at a maximum based

upon his current perceptions of his behavior.

What has

changed is his evaluation of his altruistic behavior, the
new evaluation increasing the reward value of the behavior.

Changes in cost components, e.g. an increase or

decrease in income or leisure time, would also be expected
to result in a shift of the self-concept level.

If costs
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decrease, an upward shift would
occur.

An increase in

costs would result in a downward
shift of the self-concept.

Assuming there is no change in rewards
or costs,
there is a strong tendency to maintain
one's chronic
concept level and thus maximize outcomes.

self-

There are,

however, pressures which invariably result in
shifts from
this level.

Susceptibility to such pressures appears to

be a function of the chronic level of the
self-concept,

the direction of the pressure toward change, and the

magnitude of the advocated change (Eagly, 1967).

The

experiments cited earlier (Lerner and Simmons, 19^6;

Darlington and Macker, I966) lend support to the assertion that lowering the self-concept instigates the indi-

vidual to take cognitive or behavioral action which will
raise the self-concept back to the maximum outcome level.
Such a restoration of the self-concept would be predicted

from the present maximum outcome viewpoint since, according
to the present analysis, the decrease in rewards associ-

ated with the lowering of the self-concept necessarily

outweighs the concomitant decrease in cost.

The present

study examines the behavioral effects of displacing the

benevolence dimension of the self-concept from Its

maximum outcone level.
A rise in the self-concept results in added rewards

for the individual in the form of praise and respect.
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and a general enhancement of
one's self worth.
Along
with these rewards however,
there is a rise in costs such
as time, effort and money,
which would have to be expended
if one wished to maintain this
elevated self-concept.

Because the individual was functioning
at the maximum
outcome point prior to the rise in the
self-concept, the
added costs at the new level may outweigh
the added

rewards.

Just as this imbalance created a pressure
to

restore a lowered self-concept to its chronic
level, it
will also create a pressure to restore an elevated

self-

concept to its chronic level.
so If-concept

,

In the case of the lowered

some anti-social behavior results in the

lowering and some pro-social behavior accomplishes the
lestoration.

volence

,

it

Since the dimension in Question is benefollows that pro-social behavior can raise

the self-concept and anti-social behavior may restore the

self-concept to its maximum outcome level.
The Acquisition of Pro-Social
and Anti-Social Modes
If, in fact, there exists

a,

tendency to maintain a

chronic self-concept level, the possible source of such
a tendency

may be traced back to child rearing practices.

The parents serve as the primary source of rewards and

costs since it is they upon whom the child relies to

define his self-v\'orth

.

When the child engages in "bad"

.
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behavior, the parents' reaction
typically consists of
such censorious comments as "You've
been a
bad boy."

"You ought to be ashamed of yourself,"
etc.; As a

consequence, the child’s opinion of himself
is lowered.
At the same time, however, the parents
might suggest

actions by which the child nay redeem himself

Apologize to your sister," "Help Daddy mow the lawn,"
are pro-social actions suggested by the parents as
means

of compensating for the initial "bad" behavior.

These

compensatory behaviors may result in a restoration of the
child's lov/ered self-concept throughi parental comments
such as "You're really a good boy," or "All is forgiven

because you

helped your Daddy," etc.

The process by which a child acquires antl-socjal
nodes may be based upon the manner in

v^rhich

the parents

expect the child to behave and their punitive reactions
to his behavior.

The child learns that particualar "bad"

behaviors will result in punishnent of particular severities.

Simillarly, he learns that he will receive certain

rewards from his parents for being "good."

If he attenpts

to raise his self-concept by bdng "good", thereby receiving

praise from his parents, the parents might eventually
learn to expect this "good" behavior as standard.
Although, the child miglit still be rewarded for this "good"

behavior, it is possible that these rewards decrease as
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the novelty of this behavior
decreases.

It is also

possible that behaviors which were
formerly construed as
only slipiitly "bad" are now viewed
as serious departures
from expected behavior. This would result
in

the child’s

being punished severely for acts which
formerly only
warranted a minor scolding. Although some absolute
standard of behavior may remain in effect, relative
standards may affect the rewards and costs associated
with specific behaviors.

The child learns that the added

costs incurred by raising the self-concept outweigh the

added rewards.

If the child engages in behavior which

he feels will raise his parents’ expectancies, he learns

that he can counter this possibility by engaging in sone

anti-social activity that thereby returns the parents’
e jqDectancies to a

reasonable level.

A Hom^eostatic Model of Anti-Social Behavior

The major assertion of the homeostatic model is as

follows:

A positive displacement along the benevolence

dimension of the self-concept predisposes an individual
to engage in anti-social behavior by which equilibrium, of

the self-concept

my

be restored.

Conversely, displace-

ment in the negative direction will Instigate the indi-

vidual to pro-social action.

Providing an individual

with credible information which is discrepant from his
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chronic self-concept is a cognitive
means of inducing
dlsequllibriun. Since the Individual
strives to maintain
equilibrium, external pressure, e.g. reward
or threat is

necessary to either raise or lower the
self-concept

from its maximum outcome level.

Although the self-

concept is, in general, an enduring structure,

it

is

argued that only minor pressure is required to create

temporary disequilibrium.

One reason that greater pressure

is unnecessary is that the individual has learned
efficient

means to restore euilibrium.
An example of disequilibrium in the negative direction

resulting from forced-conpliance is the instance in which
the experimenter requests the subject to administer shock
to another person.

Contributing to charity solely because

the donation was solicited by an employer represents

forced-corrpliance behavior which results in a rise in the

level of the benevolence dimension of the self-concept.

There are numerous pro-social acts which one is

pressured into committing.

The source of the pressure

can be a desire to avoid embarrassment, a desire to earn
money, a desire to please an authoritarian figure, etc.

Such pro-social gestures include holding doors for other

people, giving up one’s seat on a crowded bus, driving

courteously, contributing to charity, etc.

These fre-

quently encountered pro-social acts and their concomitant

2b

positive displaceinent of the level
of the benevolence
dinension of the self-concept are
hypothesized to account
for man’s propensity to engage in
anti-social actions.
It is important to note that
according to the present

analysis, if these pro-social acts occur
in the absence
of any pressure, e

.

g.

donating to charity even when no one

has requested a donation, then either these
acts

represent an attempt to restore to equilibrium a negatively displaced self-concept or, they represent normal

activity for that individual's chronic self-concept level.
In terms of the present analysis, the higii degree of

anti-social behavior that has often been observed among
subjects in laboratory settings would be explained

according to two processes.

Disequilibrium in a positive

direction is created when the individual is induced into

serving as

a subject.

He sees himself as expending time

and effort for the sake of scientific research and this

perception leads to an elevation of the self-concept.
This phenomenon alone would lead to a prediction of high

intensity anti-social activity in the service of lowering
the self-concept to its chronic level.

then asked to inflict harm upon another

The subject is

human being.

Even though the subject night experience conflict between

harming another human being and refusing to obey the
experimenter, the fact that he has learned efficient
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reparative modes results in his
the experinenter’s request.

con^^lyinp readily with

This readiness to conply

with an anti-social request coupled with
the fact that
the subject is striving to restore equilibrium

results

in anti-social activity of such high intensity
that pre-

dictions of trained psychiatrists grossly underestimated
the m.agnitude of anti-social behavior v/hich the subjects

exhibited in such a situation (Milgram,
miodel

I 963 ).

The present

however, predicts sUch high intensity anti-social

behavior based upon the interaction between effective
pressure due to efficient restoration modes and the
effects of disequilibrium of the benevolence dimension
of the self-concept in the positive direction.

Empirical support for a phenomenon

v;hich is closely

related to the hypothesized homeostatic model is provided
by Aronson and Carls mith (1962).

These authors assert

that psychological inconsistency (dissonance) "exists

between a cognition about the self (i.e., a self-relevant

performance e^^ectancy) and a cognition about behavior
which in inconsistent with this expectancy (p.l? 8 )."

Aronson and Carls mith hypothesized that if a subject is
given an expectancy that he will perform, poorly on a task

and is then told that his performance was, in fact, very
gpod, he will experience dissonance.

If the subject is

then given an opportunity to perform the task again, his
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latter performance will be inferior
to his initial performance so that his behavior will be
consistent with
his e^^ectancy.

This hypothesis was confirmed and

replications of the study generally support the
hypothesized phenomenon (e.g., Brock, Edelman, Edwards,
and

Schuck, 1965).
The task the subjects were given in the above experiment was novel (diagnosing schizophrenia from photographs)
so it seem.s reasonable to assure that the subjects had
1^0

preconceived notions of how

on such a task.

v/ell

they should performi

Subjects received feedback about their

performance on a preliminary phase of the task and this
feedback provided them with a performance expectancy for
a later

phase of the task.

This performance expectancy

is analogous to the chronic level of the benevolence

dimension of the self-concept relevant to the present
research.

Both performance expectancy and chronic self-

concept level inply a pognition of the self; a psychological standard from v;hich behavior should not deviate

if one is to miaintain consistency.

Aronson and Carls mlth

showed that subjects strive to behave in a manner which
is consistent with a performance expectancy.

The present

research attempts to show that behavior will be consistent
with the chronic level of the self-concept.
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Hypotheses
1.

If an Individual is pressured into
engaging in

a pro-social action that results in
a rise in the level

of the benevolence dimension of the self-concept,
he is

then predisposed to engage in anti-social behavior
that

restores the self-concept to its chronic level.
2.

If an individual is pressured into engaging in

an anti-social action that results in a lowering of the

level of the benevolence dimension of the self-concept,
he is then predisposed to engage in pro-social behavior

that restores the self-concept to its chronic level.

.

CHAPTER

II

PRETEST

Purpose
The purpose of the pretest was
to determine whether
the experimental manipulations
would effectively displace
the self-concept level in a
positive and a negative

direction.

It was also necessary to determine
whether

the instrum.ent used to measure the
self-concept was

sufficiently sensitive to changes in the self-concept
level

Subjec ts
All 60 pr.etest subjects were male students, enrolled
in an introductory psychology course at the University

of Massachusetts.

Students enrolled in this course

required to participate in
of the semester.
to each of the

3

3

v/ere

experiments during the course

Twenty subjects were randomly assigned

experimental conditions.

E xperimental Manipulations

An undergraduate female form, the Drama Department
at the University of Massachusetts was hired to carry

out the experimental manipulations.

She will be referred

to as the actress.

Positive displacement

(

D+

)

group

:

When a subject

arrived at the laboratory, he found a chair outside the
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laboratory.

A sign on the

laboratory door read:

For Experlrnent 68-41 Please Wait
Here."

generally sat down to wait.

’'Subjects

The subject

After approxi nately 30

seconds, the actress, limping as
thougii she were afflicted
with some birth defect, came out of
a nearby office,

approached the subject, and in

a meek,

stuttering voice

asked him if he would please assist her
in carrying some
books down a flight of steps and out to her
car in a nearby

parking lot.

All subjects coirplied with the request.

The subject was then thanked profusely by the
actress and

returned to the chair outside the laboratory.

The experi-

nenter, who had been inside the laboratory, opened the

laboratory door and asked the subject to come inside.
Negative displacement (D-) group
v;as

:

seated outside the laboratory, the

After the subject
e )q)eri

menter

,

who

was inside the laboratory, opened the door and asked the

subject if he

a subject for experiment 68-41.

v/as

After

the subject said "yes," the experimenter stated the fol-

lowing:

"I'll be ready for you in a few seconds. Please

wait right here as we must begin the experiment in Just
a few moments."

The experimenter then closed the door

to the laboratory.

At this point,

as in the D+ condition,

the actress came limping out of the nearby office and

asked for the subject’s assistance in carrying her books.
Since the experimenter had Just asked the subject to wait.

.
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the subject refused to assist the
actress in every instance,
generally explaining, that he could not
leave because of
his participation in an experiirent.

Looking disappointed,

the actress returned to her office,
gathered the stack
of books and as she linped out of her
office, in clear

view of the subject, dropped the stack of books
on the

corridor floor.

Precisely at this moment, the experinenter

opened the laboratory door and asked the subject to cone
inside

Control (C) group

:

Subjects in this

gi’’oup

sat outside of the laboratory for approximately

iierely
3

minutes

before the experimenter asked them to enter.

Self-Conce pt Test
Upon entering the laboratory, the subject

v/as

seated

at a desk and was asked to fill out the self-concept test.

In all conditions, the subject was told that the Psychology

Department had requested all experimenters to administer
this questionnaire to all their subjects so that the

department could assess some basic traits of their subject
population.

This rationale was given so that subjects

would not associate the self-concept test with the experimental manipulations.
The self-concept test consisted of an Instruction
sheet followed by 25 adjectives on which the subject was
to describe himself.

Each adjective was represented by
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a 9-polnt

scale which ranped from extreiiely below
average

to extremely above average (see appendix
for the instruc-

tion sheet and a list of the ad.^ect ives

)

.

Three relevant

adjectives were interspersed within the 22 Irrelevant
ones.
The relevant adjectives were:
flG- Kind; ;5'l^l- Merciful;
i5'20-

Selfish.

After the subject had filled out the

self-concept test, he was thoroughly debriefed and asked
not to speak to anyone about the experiment.

Results
In order to use the sum of the subject’s three scoi*es

("kind," "merciful," and "selfish") as the self-concept

dependent variable, it was necessary to show that these
three adjectives

v/ere

significantly interrelated.

Inter-

correlations amiong the three adjectives were calculated

without regard to experimental group, i.e. all 60 "kind"
ratings were conpared with all 60 "merciful" ratings, etc.

Significant correlations were obtained for the three

possible pairs of relevant adjectives.
"merciful," r

"selfish," r

=
=

.

661

,

-.25^*,

and "selfish," r

=

^
^

-.265,

For "kind" and

=

58, £<^.01, for "kind" and

=

58,

^

=

£<.05

and for "nerciful"

58, £<T.05.

These signifi-

cant correlations supported the assumption that all three

adjectives were indicators of benevolence and hence, the
sum of the subject's three scores constituted the
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self-concept dependent variable.
A one-way analysis of variance
on the self-concept

dependent variable (the

of the "kind," "merciful,"

suit

and reversed "selfish" scores) yielded
a sipnificant

overall difference between the three pretest
groups
(P - 18.76,

^

=

2/57,

£<

.01).

Dunnett’s tests (Myers,

1966) were enployed to compare the control group
to each

of the experimental groups.

The mean self-concept score

for subjects in the control group was I7.IO (out of
a

possible 27 Indicating maxirnum benevolence)

.

The mean

score for subjects in the positive displacement group was
19.50.

This difference,

(d - 3.30,

^

=

3 / 57

,

2 .^ 0

,

was found to be significant
i’he

£

mean self-concept

score for subjects in the neg’ative displacenent group
was 15.05.
gir’oup

Comparing this mean to that of the control

the difference,

,

(d = 2 82
.

,

_df

=

3 / 57

,

2

.

05

,

P <. 05 )

also was significant
.

Conclusions
Based upon the significant differences in selfconcept scores between subjects in the control group and

each of the experimental groups, it was concluded that
the experimental manipulations were effective in displac-

ing the self-concept in the appropriate directions and,
the self-concept test was sufficiently sensitive to

measure these displacements.

CHAPTER

III

METHOD
Sub.i’ects

All 180 subjects were male students
enrolled in the
summer session of the same introductory
pyschology course
in which the pretest subjects w’ere
enrolled. Twenty

subjects were randomly assigned to each of
groups

9

experimental

.

Experimenta l Design
A 3 x 3 conpletely randomized factorial design
was

enployed.

The first factor represents the experimental

nanipulation (described in the pretest chapter) of the
^^“*^oncept

.

Subjects in the positive displacement (D+)

group were pressured into committing the pro-social act

prior to their entering the laboratory.

According to

the hypotheses, the rise in the subject’s self-concept

level which results from this pro-social act causes him
to be predisposed to engage in anti-social behavior in

order to restore equilibrium to his self-concept.
in the negative displacement (D-)

Subjects

group were pressured

into committing an anti-social act prior to their entering
the laboratory.

This action results in a lowering of the

self-concept level and hence, subjects in this group
should be predisposed to engage in pro-social action in

,

.
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an effort to raise the self-concept
back to its rraxirmrn

outcome level.

Subjects in the control (C) group were

not pressured into performing any
action prior to their

entering the laboratory.

These subjects served as a base-

line against which the self-concepts and
dependent

variable of subjects in the D+ and D- groups could
be
compared

Within each of these groups

viere

3

additional groups.

Following the experimental manipulation, one third (20)
of the subjects in the D+

,

D-, and C groups were

given

an opportunity to inflict harm upon another human being

and were then given the test to measure the self-concept.

Another third of the subjects were given an opportunity
to help another human being immediately following the

experimental manipulation and were then given the selfconcept test.

The final third of subjects in the D+

,

D-

and C groups engaged in neutral interaction with another

person following the experimental manipulation and were
then gi.ven the self-concept test.

These subjects served

as controls for the possible effect of dyadic interaction

per se on the self-concept and also provided a baseline
for the dependent variable to which subjects in the

"harm" and "help" groups could be compared.

nental design, is shown in Figure

2

.

The experi-

—
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Opportunity to,
inflict harm

^Opportunity to
help

> Self-concept test

Neutral
interaction

Opportunity to
inflict harm

^

Opportunity to
help

Self-concept test

Neutra],

interaction
No activity...

-^Opportunity to.
Inflict harm

'^Opportunity to —

^Self-concept test

help

Neutral
interaction

Fi

p.

2.

The experimental design.

.
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Apparatu s
The basic piece of apparatus was
sirllar to that
described by Buss (I 96 I). It consisted of
a subject’s
rnodule and a relay rack both of
which were in the labora-

tory.

These pieces of equipment were connected to
an

experimenter’s nodule in an adjoining room.
module consisted of 10 pull levers numbered

The subject’s
1

through 10

in a horizontal rov/ with a red light above each
lever.
At

the top of the module were

2

additional lights; a green

light labelled "left cue response" and an amber light

labelled "right cue response."
a series of relays, wires,

The relay rack contained

an interval tiner, and a buzzer.

When the subject depressed a lever, the buzzer rang for
1

second and the red light above that lever went on for

1

second
The experimenter’s m.odule in the adjoining room,

consisted of

2

levers which activated the left or right

cue response lights on the subject’s module.
on the e xperimenter

’

s

Ten lights

module indicated which lever the

subject had depressed.

Procedure
Subjects given the opportunity to inflict harm.

(H^^) group

)

.

Upon entering the laboratory, the subject

was seated in front of his module and was given the

following instructions.

"This experiment is concerned
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with the effects of electric
shock on cardiac deceleration
in humns.
Electrodes will be attached to rry
assistant
in the adjoining room and
I will be in there
recording
his physiological reactions
to receiving shock.
Your
Job will be the following:
Every time the
left cue

response

llgjcit

goes on, you are to do nothing.

Every

time the rlglit cue response light
goes on, you are to
press one of these shock levers. You
may press any lever

you wish, but do not hold it down, merely
press it and

release it inmediately.

The higher the number of the

shock lever, the greater the intensity of shock
which
the lever delivers.

Lever Numher

1

delivers Just enough

current to cause a mild, tingling sensation.

delivered by lever Nuinber

5

The current

causes very mild pain.

The

shock from lever Number 10 results in extreme pain to
the recipient of the shock.

I

am going into

ing room to hook up the apparatus.

the adjoin-

In a few minutes,

one of the cue response lights will go on and the experinent will have begun.

Do you have any questions?''

The experimenter then went into the adjoining room
and after several minutes, during which he was supposedly

hooking up the physiological recording apparatus, he
turned on a tape recorder which played a pre“-recorded

conversation between the experimenter and another male.
This recorded conversation could be heard by the subject

.
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and was desipped to convince
him that there was, in fact,
another person in the adjoining
room who would actually
be receiving the shock.

After the recording was over,

the experimenter sat in front of
his module and began a

randomly pre-deteriTlned series of lever
presses, 10 of
which lighted the subject's left cue response
lighit and
10 of which lighted the right cue response
light.

The

dependent measure was the mean level shock administered
by the subject on the 10 "shock trials."

Following this part of the procedure, the experimenter returned to the subject's room to administer the
1

ap t test along with the rationale for adminis-

tering the test described in the pretest chapter.

After

the subject had filled out the self-concept test, he was

asked to fill out an additional questionnaire which was

desipned to find out if he had employed some cognitive
means to restore equilibrium to the self-concept.

The

questionnaire revealed how the subject evaluated his own

behavior in relation to the experimenter, in relation to
the experimenter's assistant, and how the subject per-

ceived the experimental procedure per se (see appendix
for a copy of the questionnaire).
S ubjects

given the opportunity to help

(

HELP group )

The procedure for subjects in this group was the same as
the procedure for the subjects in the HARM proup

.

The

instructions given the subject
were changed as follows:
"This experiment is concerned
with the physiological
effects of receiving reward.
Electrodes will be attached
to my assistant in the adjoining
room and I
will be in

there recording his physiological
reactions to receiving
reward.
Your job will be the following: Every
time the
left cue response light goes on, you
are to do nothing.
Evei y time the right cue response
light goes on, you are

to press one of these reward levers.

You may press any

lever you wish but, do not hold it down, merely
press it
and release it immediately.

The higher the number of

the reward lever, the greater the magnitude of reward

which the lever delivers.

Each lever number represents

ten cents so tnat lever Number

Number

5

a dollar.

1

delivers a dime, lever

delivers fifty cents, and lever Number 10 delivers
assistant is permitted to keep the money

My

he receives.

I

am going into

up the apparatus..

In a

fev7

l^he

adjoining room to hook

minutes, one of the cue response

li gilts will go on and the experiment will have begun.

you have any questions?"
Again, the experimenter went into the adjoining
roomi and played a taped conversation to convince the

subject that there was, in fact, another person in the

adjoining room who would be receiving the reward.

The

dependent measure of pro-social behavior was the nean

Do

level of reward administered
by the subject on the 10
"reward trials." Again, there
was a total of 20 trials.
The subject was then given
the self-concept test and the

post-experimental questionnaire.

Neutr^ Interaction

(NI)

proup

.

After being seated

in front of the module, subjects
in this group were given
the following instructions:
"This

experiment is concerned

with the effects of light on pupillary
dilation in humans.
Electrodes will be attached to iry assistant
in the adjoining room and I will be in there recording
his physiological reactions to the light.
ing:

you

Your job will be the follow-

Every time the left cue response light goes on,
a.re

lipi'it

to do nothing.

Every time the right cue response

goes on, you are to press one of these light levers.

You may press any one you wish but, do not hold it down,

merely press it and release it immediately.

The higher

the number of the light lever, the brighter the light

which the lever activates.

Each lever number represents

ten v/atts of brightness so, lever Nunberl activates a
ten watt light, lever Number

5

activates a fifty watt

light, and lever Number 10 activates a one hundred watt
lipht.

I

am going into the adjoining room to hook up

the apparatus.

In a few rrinutes one of the cue response

lights will go on and the experiment will have begun.
Do you have any questions?”

.

Again, a recording was played
and the e xpcri menter
recorded the itean lever pull for
the 10 "light trials."
Again, there was a total of 20
trials. The subject was
then given the self-concept test
and the post-e xperlnental
questionnaire

Summary of

P redictions

Subjects who have been pressured into assisting
the
actress and therefore show an elevation of the
self-concept,
are predisposed to engage in anti-social behavior
(adniin-

istering shock), which has the aim of lowering the selfconcept back to its chronic level.

Subjects who have refused to assist the actress and
therefore show a lowering of the self-concept level, are

predisposed to engage in pro-social behavior (adminis-

tering reward) which has the aim of raising the selfconcept back to its chronic level.

CHAPTER

IV

RESULTS
This chapter is divided into three

irain

sections.

The first section deals with the
lever-pressin p dependent
variable which represents the behavioral
effects
of the

self-concept manipulations.

The second section addresses

Itself to the post-experimental questionnaire.
of these data yield information

Analyses

about possible cofnitive

effects of the self-concept manipulations.

The final

section deals with the self-concept test and provides

information concerning changes in the self-concept level

resulting fro m the various independent variables.
Maj or Dependen t Variab le

(

lever -pressin

An analysis of variance of the

g)

3x3

completely

randomized factorial design was perforned using the
mean of the 10 levers pressed by the subject as the

dependent variable.
Table

1

The group means are presented in

and a sumjnary of the analysis of variance is

presented in Table

2.

The overall difference between the HELP, NI, and

HARM gi’oups was significant (F

=

61.29,

^

=

2/171,

£<r.001) as was the overall difference created by the

self-concept manipulation (F

=

6.77,

^

=

2/171, £'^.005).

The interaction between the perceived effect of
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TABLE

1

Mean Lever Pressed by Subjects

Perceived effect of lever-pressing

Manipulation of
the self-concept

Help

Neutral Harm
interaction

Mean

(NI)

Positive
displacement (D+)

6.1k

5.58

5.26

5.86

Control (C)

5.69

5.51

3.50

4.90

displace rr.ent (D-)

7.84

5.88

2.80

5.51

Mean

6.75

5.65

3.85

Ne gative

Note- Possible scores ran ged from a minimum, of 1.00 to a
ma ximu m of 10 00
.

^15

TABLE

2

Analysis of Variance of Lever-Pressinf
Dependent Variable

Source of variation

F

Ml

Perceived effect of
lever-pressln f (A)

2

128.60

Manipulation of the
self-concept (B)

2

14.20

6.77*

20.96

9

A X B

Error

*•

£<.00t>

**

£<.001

171

2.10

61.29«*

,

99 **

.
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lever-pressing and the rranipulat
ion of the self-concept
was also siejiificant (F =
=
9-99,

^

4 / 171

^<.001).

,

Dunnett's tests were errployed
to analyze the main
effects.
Scores of the HELP and HARM subjects
were compared to those of the NI subjects.
As shown in Table 1,
subjects who were told that pressing
a lever delivered
electric shock to the experimenter’s
assistant (HARM
subjects), pressed significantly lower
numbered levers
than subjects who were told that the levers
merely acti-

vated a

ligiit

(d = 6 81
.

,

^

=

3 / 171

,

p

<.005).

Subjects

who were told that pressing the lever delivered
a monetary

reward to the experimenter

’

s

assistant (HELP subjects),

pressed significantly higher numbered levers than did the
NI subjects (d

=

4.16, df =

3 / 171

,

p<:.005).

The analysis

of the main effect of the self-concept manipulation

yielded the following results.

Subjects who had assisted

the actress prior to their entering the laboratory (D+

subjects), pressed si gnif leant ly higher

numbered levers

than did subjects who merely sat outside the laboratory

before entering (C subjects) (d

£<. 005 ).

=

3.64,

^

=

3 / 171

,

Similarly, subjects who had refused to assibt

the actress because of the experimenter's interference
(D- subjects), also pressed si gnif icantly higher num-

bered levers than did the control subjects (d

«

=

3/171, £<.05)

=

2

.

30

,

The source of the significant
as follows:

within the HELP

gi^oup

AxB
,

interaction was

the D- subjects

pressed significantly higher numbered
levers than did
the control subjects (d = 3 83 df =
.

3/57,

,

E<.005) while

the lever-pressing of the D+ subjects
and the control

subjects did not differ.

The reverse held true within

the HARM group where the D+ subjects yielded
significantly

higher scores than the control subjects (d
df

=

=3

.
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,

3/57, £<^. 005 ) and the scores of the D- and control

subjects did not differ significantly.

Within the HI

group, the lever-pressin g of the D+ and D- gi^oups did

not differ significantly from that of the control group.
Post - Experimental Questionnaire Items

Analyses of variance were performed on subjects’

responses to each of the six questionnaire items.
summary of these analyses is presented in Table
Ite m

1^.

i

"Do you

scientific value ?"

tliink

A

3-

that this experinent has

Group means of subjects’ responses

to this itemi are presented in Table

4.

An analysis of

responses to this question yielded

vai’iance on subjects’

a significant main effect of the self-concept manipulation

(F =

3

.

23

,

^

=

2 / 171

,

£<T-05).

The mean response for

D- subjects was 5*70 (out of a possible

9

indicating

naximum scientific value) and the mean response for control

i

1

—^

11

1i

1

1
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TABLE
Ratings of the Scientific

Inportance of the Experiment

Perceived effect of lever-pressing

Manipulation of
the self-concept

Help

Neutral
Harm
interaction

Mean

(NI)

Positive
di spacemen!

5.25

5.^5

5.05

5.25

5.25

4.70

5.05

5.00

displacement (D-)

5.^5

5.80

5.85

5.70

Me an

5.32

5.32

5.32

(D-J-)

Control (C)
Ne gat ive

Note--On all six items, 1.00 = nost negative response and
9.00 - most positive response.

^0

subjects was 5.00.
(d

^

2.51,

-

The difference,

3 /l 7 ij

g<i.Q 25 ).

.

70

,

was slFniflcant

No slfnlfloant differ-

ences existed between responses
of the D+ subjects and
control subjects.
"Did you ^njoy part icl at Inp;
p

ir
i

ment ?

^

this exper -

Group means of subjects* responses
to this

are presented in Table 5.

ite.m.

The analysis of variance

revealed no significant main effects but did
yield a
Significant Interaction between the perceived

effect of

lever-pressing and the manipulation of the self-concept
“

2.98,

d_f

=

V17I, £<C. 025 ).

The source of the

significant interaction was as follows:

only v;ithin

the

HARM group did the D+ subjects enjoy participating in the
experiment significantly more than did the D- subjects

^

(P = 6.97,

=

2 / 57

£<C* 01 ).

,

Although

the D+ responses

were higher than the control responses while the D-

responses were lower than the control responses

,

neither

the D+ or D- responses differed significantly from the

control subjects* responses.

Item

"Do you think you were helpful in providing

the e yperl menter wit h suitable dat a?"

Group means of

subjects* responses to this item are presented in Table

6.

The analysis of variance on responses to this itemi yielded
a

significant difference due to the self-concept manipu-

lation (F

=

6 .^ 2

,

^

=

2/171, p<^.005) but no differences
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TABLE

5

Ratings of Subjects' Enjoy nent of

Participating in the Experirrent

Perceived effect of lever'-pressing

Manipulation of
the self-concept

Help

Neutral Harm
Interaction

Mean

(NI)

Positive
displacement (D+)

5.10

5.50

5.85

5.il8

Control (C)

5.20

5.^0

^.80

5.13

Ne gat ive

5.60

6.20

(1.35

5.38

5.30

5.70

5.00

displacement (D-)
Mean

52

TABLE

6

Ratings of How Helpful Subjects Were

in Providing;

The Experimenter With Suitable Data

Perceived effect of lever-pressing:

Manipulation of
the self-concept

Help

Neutral
Harm
interaction

Mean

(NI)

Positive
displace ment (D+)

5.15

5.20

5.55

5.30

Control (C)

i|.80

5.10

4.90

4.93

displace rnent (D-)

6.05

6.00

5.30

5.78

Mean

5.33

5.43

5.25

Ne ga.tive

^

due to the

effect of lever-pressln f"
variable.

The source
of the significant effect
was the fact that the D- subjects responded more positively
to this Item than did
the control subjects (d =
= 3/171, £<.005).
3.57,
The D+ subjects did not differ
to^the control subjects
on their responses to this item.

^

Item

"Do

^

with your performance

think the experimenter was pleased

^

a

subject ?"

The analysis of

variance on responses to this question yielded
no significant effects.

—^

"2£

think the

participating in this

e

e

xperimenter

xperiment ?"

’

s

assistant

Group means

of subjects’ responses to this item are presented in

Table

7.

The analysis of variance revealed that both

the "effect of lever-pressing" variable and the manipu-

lation of the self-concept affected subjects’ responses
to this item (P
~

=

11.^9,

^

=

2/171, £<^.001 and F

2/1/'!, £<[^.05 respectively).

£

005)

.PO, was significant

(d = 3.17,

^

The
=

3/171,

No difference was found between the HELP and

NI subjects.

The effect of the self-concept manipulation

was as follows:
(

3.33,

The mean response of

HARM subjects was 3-95 and of NI subjects 4.85.
difference,

=

subjects

v;ho

had assisted the actress

D+ subjects) judged that the experimenter’s assistant

enjoyed participating in the experiment nore than did

TABLE

7

Ratings of How Much the E xperi rrenter

’

s

Assistant

Enjoyed Participating in the Experirrent

Perceived effect of lever-pressing

Manipulation of
the self-concept

Help

Neutral
Harm
interaction

Mean

(NI)

Positive
displacement (D+)

6.00

4.85

4.35

5.6?

Control (C)

4.85

4.80

3.33

4.33

oo

4.91

4.15

4.69

5.28

4.85

3.95

Ne gat ive

displacement (D-)
Me an

\s\

•

.

the control subjects (d

=2

.

58

^

,

= 3 / 171

^

£<. 025 ).

No

difference was found between the
D- and control subjects.
The interaction was not
significant.

Item

6

"Do

.

ej^erimonter

^

^

think that you were kind

a^sj^stant?"

^

the

Group neans of subjects'

responses to this item are presented in
Table 8
Althouph
neither main effect proved sippificant,
the analysis of
.

variance on responses to this item yielded
a significant
A X B

interaction (F

=

2.53, df

Vl71, £<.05).

=

The

source of the interaction was that within the HELP
group,
the D+ subjects answered this question more
positively

than did the control subjects (d

£<. 01 ).

= 2

.

86

,

df

= 3 / 57

,

This was the only statistically significant

comparison

Self-Concept Test
The mean self-concept scores (the sum of the "kind,"

"merciful," and reversed "selfish" ratings) for each
group are presented in Table

and a summary of the

9

analysis of variance is presented in Table 10.

nificant

rrain

effects were found but the analysis did

yield a significant interaction (F
£^

4^(1 .

005

).

No sig-

=

4.^7,

^

=

Vl71,

Further analyses revealed that the source of

the Interaction

v/as

that within the NI group, D- subjects

had significantly lower self-concept scores than did the

control subjects (d

=2

.

58

,

^

=

3 / 57

,

£^^. 02 ^), while

TABLE

8

Ratings of How Kind tho Subjects Were
to the Experimenter's Assistant

Perceived effect of lever-pressing

Manipulation of
the self-concept

Help

Neutral
Harm
interaction

Mean

(NI)

Positive
displace ment (D+)

5.90

5.60

5.05

5.52

Control (C)

^.65

^

1.95

5.70

5.10

Ne gative
displace irent (D-)

5.^0

5.10

5.35

5.28

5.22

5.37

Me an

LT\

•

on

C\l

57

TABLE

9

Group Moans of Self-Concept Scores

Perceived effect of lever-pressing

Manipulation of
the self-concept

Help

Neutral Harm
interaction

Mean

(NI)

Positive
displace irent (D+)

17.30

19.35

18.00

18.22

Control (C)

17.

<15

17.80

17.95

17.73

Negative
displace ment (D-)

17.

Its

15.85

18.30

17.20

Mean

17.40

17.67

18.08
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TABLE 10

Analysis of Variance
of Self-Concept Data

Source of variation

F

Perceived effect of
lever-pressing (A)

2

7.12

1.36

Manipulation of the
self-concept 3

2

15.52

2.96

A X B

4

23.43

4.47*

Error

171

5.24

(

le

r^

nnc;

)

D+ subjects within the NI proup had
si rnif icant ly hipher

self-concept scores than did the control subjects
(d = 2.05,

^

=

3/57, £^.05).

It was also found that

the low self-concept score for the D-/NI proup
was sipnif-

icantly lower than the averape self-concept score of
the
D-/HFjLP and D-/HARM proups combined (d =^.85, df =
3/171,

£^.005).

Sinilarly, the hi

£d:i

self-concept mean of the

D+/N1 proup was si pnificant ly hipher than the averape

self-concept score of the D+/HELP and D+/HARM proups
combined (d

=

i|.07,

^

=

3/171, £<.005).

In other words,

the effect of the self-concept manipulation was manifested
on the self-concept test only when the subject enpaged in

subsequent neutral interaction in which no
shock was involved.

rev^’ard

or

CHAPTER

V

DISCUSSION

Hypothesis

I

The flndinps of this study lend a
considerable

amount of support to the hypothesis, which stated
that

pro-social

action which results in an increase in one’s

opinion of his own benevolence, instigates an individual
to anti— social action which has the aim of restoring

the self-concept to its chronic level.
In terms of the lever-pressing variable errployed

in the present research design, the specific prediction

generated by Hypothesis

1

was that subjects

v;ho

engaged

in pro-social action (D+ subjects) would administer

a

higher level of shock than would the control subjects
who did not engage in pro-social action.

The finding

that, in the HARM condition, the D+ subjects pressed
si gnificant ly higher numbered levers than did the C

subjects represents strong support for Hypothesis

1.

In terms of the self-concept data, the prediction

was that the self-concepts of the D+ subjects who had

been given an opportunity to administer shock (D+/HARM

subjects

)

to the experimenter’s assistant would not

differ form the self-concepts of control subjects who
received no self-concept manipulation.

The finding that

.

6l

the self-concept scores of the
D+/HARM subjects and the

C/HARM subjects did not differ while the
self-concept
riean

of the D+/NI group was significantly higher
than

the self-concept

irean

of the D+/HARM group leads to the

conclusion that the high magnitude anti-social behavior
exhibited in the laboratory by the D+/HARM subjects
served to restore the experimentally raised self-concepts
to a chronic level.

One ml

gilt

predict fro m the homeostatic model that

pro-social action which raises an individual's selfconcept level would inhibit him from engaging in further

pro-social action which might have the effect of raising
the self-concept level even further.

In terms of the

present research design, D+ subjects would have been

expected to administer a lower level of reward than would
the control (C) subjects, who were not exposed to any

self-concept manipulation.

This expectation was not

confirmed
The possibility" that a lack of effectiveness of the
D+ self-concept manipulation could account for the absence

of this expected effect is discounted by the analyses of
the self-concept data from both the pretest and the

actual

e

xperi rent

.

Further, the finding that the self-

concept scores for the D+/HELP subjects were significantly
lower than the self-concept scores for the D+/NI subjects
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indicates that the D+/HELP subjects did
succeed in

restoring the experimentally raised self-concept
to

a

chronic level.

Since the lever-pressing data indicated that the

D+/HELP subjects did not employ behavioral means to
restore equilibrium: to the self-concept, perhaps some

cognitive neans was utilized.

If the D+/HELP subjects

evaluated their reward-administering behavior differently than did the the C/HELP subjects, such differences
might be revealed by analyses of the post-experimental

questionnaire items.

Specifically, the D+/HELP subjects

should have evaluated their reward-administering behavior
as being less helpful to the experimenter and/or the

experinenter
subjects.

'

s

assistant than should have the C/HELP

Analyses of the questionnaire data revealed

no si fnif leant differences between the D+/HELP and
the C/HELP groups on any of the six questions.

Another possible explanation for the restoration of
the D+/HELP self-concepts in the absence of supporting

lever-pressing data is that these subjects acconplished
the restoration process via some eo^iitve means which

was not tapped in the present study.

For exaiple, it is

possible that the reward-administering instruct ions which
followed the pro-social manipulation

were perceived as a

threat to further elevate the self-concepts of the D+/HELP

,
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subjects.

In order to prevent any further
displace rent

the D+/HELP subjects rd fht have
re-evaluated the benevolence aspect of aiding the actress
so that the aiding

behavior was evaluated as neutral,
anyone else would have done.”

e

.

g.

only did what

if these subjects then

evaluated their giving reward to the

e

xperi rrenter

'

s

assistant as either a neutral or slightly
pro-social
action, equilibrium of the self-concept could have been

maintained and the D+/HELP self-concept scores v;ould not
m those of the C/NI subjects.

The possibility

that the rev/ard— ad ninistering behavior was not perceived
as highly pro-social is supported by the lack of any

difierences between the HELP and NI groups on the questionnaire item, concerning the experimenter's assistant's
enjoy irent of the experiment (item:

5)

or on the item con-

cerning the subjects’ being kind to the experimenter's
assista.nt

(item 6).

Admittedly, such an interpretation

is highly speculative and the present study did not erploy

the dependent variables needed to test such an interpre-

tation

.

Although the data obtained from the subjects in the
D+/HELP group are difficult to interpret, the critical
test of Hypothesis

1

involved the comparison of the levers

pressed by the D+/HAR^^ subjects and the C/HARM subjects
and the self-concept scores

of the D+/HARM subjects and

the D+/NI subjects.

These comparisons

sup;(Ter,ted

that

a positive displaoenent of one's
position alonp the bene-

volence dinension of the self-concept
does. In fact,
instigate an individual to anti-social
action (when such
a response is nade salient) which
restores the self-concept

to its chronic level.

Hypothesis

2

Considerable support was also found for the hypothesis which asserted that a decrease in
of his

ov;n

one's

opinion

benevolence resulting from anti-social action

instip;ates an individual to pro-social action which

restores the self-concept to its chronic level.
In terms of the lever-pressing variable, the specific

prediction generated by Hypothesis

was that subjects

2

who engaged in anti-social action (D- subjects) would
admi.nister a higher level of reward to the experimenter’s

assistant than would the control subjects who did not
engage in anti-social action.

The finding that, in the

HELP condition, the D- subjects pressed significantly

higher numbered levers than did the

C

subjects confirms

the above prediction.
In terns of the self-concept data, the prediction

was that the self-concepts of the D- subjects who had

been given an opportunity to administer reward (D-/HELP

.

.
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subjects) would not differ
from the self-concepts
of
control subjects who were
not exposed to any
self-concept
manipulation. The finding
that the self-concept
scores
of the D-/HELP subjects did
not differ fron those of the
C/HELP subjects while the
self-concept mean of the D-/N 1
group was sl0,ificantly lower
than the self-concept mean
of the D-/HELP group leads
to the conclusion that the
high magnitude pro-social
behavior exhibited in the
laboratory by the D-/HELP subjects
served to restore the
experimentally lowered self-concepts
back to a chronic
level

According to the present analysis, pro-social
behavior nay consist merely of refuslno- to

commit an act

which

rra

HARM

subjects

o-ht

injure another human being.

As such,

the

v;ere all

given an opportunity to engage

in pro-social behavior.

By choosing to press only the

lower nur,)bered levers, the HARM subjects could have

refrained from causing harm^ to the experimenter’s assistant.

According to the homeostatic model then, the D-

subjects should have administered a lower level of shock
than the control subjects.

This expectation was not

supported
Again, analyses of the self-concept data indicated
that the negative displace

rrent

self-concept manipulation

was effective so that the lack of a difference in

.
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Shock- flvlng between the
D-/HARM and c/HARM ^n-oups
cannot be attributed to
a failure to displace
the seifconcept
one possible explanation
for the absence of a
slEnlf
leant difference in
lever-nre^si
r
n
pressing
between the D-/HARM
and C/HARM ^oups
involves a rethodolo.lcal
consideration
It is possible that the
mean shook level of
o-

the C/IIARM

fToup was so low (3.50 out
of a possible 10) that
there
was an insufficient number
of levers below this mean
to

allow foi a si pnlflcantly
lower score, especially If
subjects perceived their task
as one which required their
pressinfT various levers. Such
a percept mlftit have

prevented a subject frompressing
ten ”ls,” or five "Is"
and five "2s," etc.
The self-concept analyses also
indicated that the

D-/HARM subjects successfully restored
the initially
lowered self-concept to a chronic level.
Since the

lever-pressing data indicated that the restoration
was
not accomplished via behavioral means,
the possibility

again exists that some cognitive means was errployed.

Analyses of the post-e

jq^eri

mental questionnaire data

revealed no significant differences between the D-/HARM
and the C/HARM groups on any of the six items.

Again,

it would appear that restoration of the self-concept

was ac CO mp lished via

s

ome co gni t i ve means which was not
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tapped in the present study.
The finding that both the
D+/HELP subjects and the
D-/HARM subjects successfully restored
equilibrium to
the self-concept while falling
to yield supporting behavioral (lever-pressing) data tends
to support the homeo-

static niodel.

Although the means by which the self-concepts

were shifted back to the maximum outcome
level remains

undetected, the fact remains that the experimentally
induced displacements were only temporary.

The finding

that the self-concepts of the D+/N1 subjects and
D-/NI

subjects did not return to a chronic level supf^sts
that there was sone aspect of the reward- giving and

shock— giving situations which mediated the restoration
in the D+/HELP and D-/HARM groups.

once

It is possible that,

the self-concept level is displaced, if the individual

is then faced with a situation v;hich threatens to shift

the self-concept level even further, he re-evaluates the

behavior which resulted in the initial displacement.
Unfortunately, the present study did not employ the
dependent variables needed to determine the nature of the

cognitive process by which the D-f/HELP and D-/HARM
subjects accomplished restoration.

Although the data obtained from the D-/HARM group
is subject to several interpretations, the fact renains

that the D- subjects who were given an opportunity to
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reward the expert nenter'

s

assistant administered a

slpilflcantly greater mapriitude

of reward than did control

subjects who were given the
sane opportunity.
This
finding, coupled with the fact
that the reward-giving
behavior raised the negatively
displaced self-concepts
of the D-/HELP subjects back to
a chronic level, represents
Strong support for Hypothesis 2.
Additional Findings
Thus far, only those results which had
a direct

bearing on the hypotheses have been discussed.

The data

analyses revealed several other significant effects

which are tangential to the hypotheses, but nonetheless,
are of psychological interest.

Analyses of the lever-pressing data revealed that
the subjects who were told that they were delivering

shock to the experimenter's assistant pressed significantly lower nunbered levers than did the NI subjects

who believed that they were merely activating a light.
It

VIQ.S

also found that the subjects who were led to

believe that they were delivering reward to the experimenter's assistant pressed significantly higher numbered

levers than did the NI subjects.

Such a finding is not

surprising and merely indicates that the subjects were
miore

prone to adhere to, rather than deviate from, the

.

.
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benevolence norm

repardless of any self-concept iranlpu-

lation
The finding that the D+

subjects and the D- subjects

pressed significantly higher nurrbered
levers than did
the control subjects who received
no self-concept

nanipu-

lation was not expected.

This finding- indicates that

the self-concept manipulation
(regardless of direction)
led to an increase in the magnitude
of the stimulus

(shock, light, and noney) which the subjects
administered
in the laboratory.

One possible explanation for this

finding is suggested by the "frustration-aggression
hypothesis (Dollard, Doob
1939)

,

Miller, Mowrer, and Sears,

or the "frustration-drive hypothesis" (Brown, I961).

These hypotheses assert that one result of frustration
is hign magnitude responding.

Since, in the present

study, f orced-conpliance behavior was used to displace
the self-concept from, its chronic level, this displacement
may have constituted a frustrating event.

If the D+ and

D- subjects entered the laboratory iminediately after

having e^qjerienced frustration, then the high magnitude
lever-pressing which these subjects exhibited would be
anticipated
Analyses of the questionnaire data also yielded
several interesting findings.

It was found that the

subjects who refused to assist the actress (D- subjects)
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rated the scientific irrportance
of the experinent significantly higher than did the
control subjects. Viewed in
terms of cognitive dissonance
theory (Festinger, 1957)
this finding is easily interpretable.
One of the postulates of cognitive dissonance
theory is that, once an
individual has made a choice from two
or irore alternatives,
he tends to enhance the chosen
alternative. This enhancement may be viewed as an attenpt by
the individual to

convince himself that he has, in fact, made
the correct
choice.

In the present study, participation in the

ejqDerinent provided the D- subjects with a rationale
for

refusing to assist the actress.

The more scientifically

iirportant the experiment, the more Justified the subjects

were in choosing to fulfill their role as subject rather
than helping the actress and possibly arriving late for
the start of the experinent.

By upgrading the scientific

inpcrtance of the experiment, the D- subjects were

enhancing their chosen alternative.
Given the above finding, one night also expect that,
in an effort to reduce any dissonance created by the

refusal to assist the actress, the D- subjects would have

enjoyed participating in the experiment more than did
the control subjects.

As indicated in Table 5, the D-

mean was higher than the control mean, but the difference was
not statistically significant.

There was however, a

.
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significant interaction.

Within the HARM proup, the D+

subjects enjoyed participating in the
experinent significantly rore than did the D- subjects.
It is tenptinp
to interpret this finding- as indicating
that subjects

who were given a behavioral opportunity to restore
the

shifted self-concept back to the chronic level enjoyed
the experiment more than did the D-/HARM subjects who

were not given this opportunity.

If this interpretation

were valid, one would expect that within the HELP group,
the D- subjects would have enjoyed participating in the

experiment more than the

D4*

subjects did since the

D-/HELP subjects were also given a behavioral opportunity
to restore to equilibrium the experimentally shifted

self-concept.

Althougli the group means were in the

anticipated direction, the difference was not statistically
si pnificant

How can one explain the difference in "enjoyment"

between the D-f/HARM and the D-/HARM subjects and the lack
of such a difference between the D-/HELP and the D-f/HELP

subjects?

A perusal of Table 5

("Did you enjoy partici-

pating in this experiment?) reveals the
finding.

source of this

Ad ninisterin g shock depressed scores on this

question in the D-/HARM group and the C/HARM group but not
in the D+/HARM

group.

The scores of the D+/HARM subjects

did not differ from the scores of the D+/NI subjects.
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Ihls indicates that the D+/HARM

frroup

participating in the experiment any
neutral interaction subjects.

did not enjoy

irore

than did the

The source of the sipnifi-

cant effect was the fact that negative affect was created
in the C/HARM and .D-/HARM groups but not in the D+/HARM

group.

The D+/HARM subjects engaged in pro-social action

(aiding the actress) and anti-social action (administer-

ing shock to the

e

xperi renter

'

s

assistant) and hence,

their total experience was neither pleasant nor unpleasant.
The C/HARM and D-/HARM subjects only engaged in anti-

social action and hence, they enjoyed the experiment less
than did the D+/HARM subjects.
It was found that the D- subjects rated themselves

as si

g'Vii

f leant ly

rore helpful to the experi renter than

did the control subjects.

Such a percept may indicate

that the D- subjects were er^ioying a cogriitive reans in

their atterpt to raise their self-concepts back to the
maxi rum outcome level.

It should be noted however, that

this finding that the D- subjects rated themselves as
si fnif leant ly

rore helpful to the e

x{'>eri

renter than did

the control subjects is also subject to a dissonance

By seeing ther:selves as bein g

interpretation.

helpful to the

e

xperlrenter

,

e xtre rely

the D- subjects migiit have

been trying to Justify their earlier refusal to assist
the actress.

s

.
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The finding that subjects who adndnistered
shock
to the experi neuter’s assistant rated the
e xperl nenter

'

assistant's enjoyment in taking part in the experiment

(item

5)

significantly lower than did the NI subjects

leads to an obvious conclusion.

Subjects believed that

it is

more pleasant to have one's pupils dilated by

li

than to have one's heart decelerated by electric

£iit

shock.

Althougii the

nean response of the HELP subjects

to this question was higher than the mean response of

the NI subjects, the difference was not statistically
sigriificant

Analyses of the questionnaire data revealed that
the D+ subjects responded to item.

5

("Do you think the

experimenter's assistant enjoyed paricipating in this
experiment?") significantly
control subjects.

nxDre

positively than did the

It was also found that within the

HELP group, the D+ subjects rated thenselves as being
si fnificant ly
(itemi 6)

nore kind to the experimenter's assistant

than did the control subjects.

These two find-

ings suggest that sone generalization effect

m.ay

have

been operative, i.e. these subjects helped the actress

prior to their entering the laboratory and therefore

perceived themselves as helping (providing enjoynent
for and being kind to) the experimenter's assistant.
If,

in fact, such a generalization effect was operative,

,

7^

then one would expect that the
D+ subjects would also
show hiph scores on the questions
concerning helping
the experinienter (items 3 and
4) and would also exhibit
hiph self-concept scores (since the
generalization

phenomenon would tend to maintain the
experimentally
raised self-concept level). Analyses of
the post-experimental questionnaire data and the self-concept
data
failed to reveal these anticipated effects.
I

irplications of the Homeostatic Model

Glass (1964) asserts that an upward shift of the
^

con cep t level results in behavior which is consist-

ent with the new self-concept level while the homeostatic

model asserts that an upward shift of the self-concept
level results in behavior which tends to restore the

self-concept to a chronic level.

V/hile these two

approaches appear to generate oppoang predictions
the two approaches are conpatible if one takes into

account temporal factors involved in the restoration

process.

According to the homeostatic nodel, an upward

displacenent in the self-concept level is not

permanent because the rewards associated with the raised
self-concept level are outweighted by the costs of main-

taining the new self-concept level.

The rewards (an

increase in feelings of self-v;orth and self-respect)
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are experienced immediately while
the costs of naintaininp: the elevated self-concept
level need not be

Incurred

i

mnediately

.

Only at such a

tirre

as the costs

must be Incurred (e.fr. the individual
is faced with an

opportunity to engage in additional benevolent
activity)
or, the means to restore the self-concept
to its normal

level are made salient (thereby making the costs
of

restoration minimal) will the individual behave in such
a manner as to lower the elevated self-concept to its

chronic level.

In other words, there is no reason to

predict that a positive displacement of the self-concept
level v/ill instigate an individual to create a situation

which will permit

hlmi to

engage in anti-social action.

The individual has learned that opportunites to violate
the benevolence norm are frequently encountered and

hence, he is able to experience temporarily the rev;ards

associated with the elevated self-concept level until
the opportunity arises to restore the self-concept to
its chronic level.

This resistance to restoration which typifies an

elevated self-concept is not encountered when one is

dealing with

a

downward shift in the self-concept level.

The costs incurred when the self-concept is lowered
(a decrease in feelings of self-worth and self-respect)

are e^erienced

1

minediately

.

The rewards, e.g. a decrease
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in the olipatlon to enpafe in
benevolent activity,

are not only outweighed by the added
costs but also
are not experienced until such time as the
individual
is confronted with the choice of whether
to enpape in

some mode of benevolent activity.

The costs which are

immediately Incurred instipate the individual to seek
out a situation in which he may enpape in pro-social

activity which restores the self-concept to the chronic
level and the individual is alleviated of the added

costs he is currently incurrlnp.
In a recent study by Aronson and Mettee (1968),

the authors interpreted their results as indicating

that lowering the self-concept level results in behavior

which is consistent with the new self-concept level.
Such a position is obviously inconpatible with the

arpument presented above.

In the Aronson and Mettee

study, subjects were given false feedback from psycho-

logical tests which (it was presumed) resulted in a

lowering of the self-concept level.

When these subjects

were then given an opportunity to cheat and win money
in a gave of "Blackjack," it was found that they took

advantage of this opportunity mere often than did subjects who had not been given false, negative feedback.
The authors interpreted this finding as indicating that
the immoral cheating behavior was more consistent with
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the experimentally lowered
self-concept level than with
a normal self-concept level.
It is possible however,

to Interpret the Aronson

and Mettee finding as supporting the
present homeostatic
model.

If one Interprets cheating behavior in their

experimental setting as an attempt to achieve, excel,
or do well relative to the performance of other
subjects,

then the cheating behavior may have represented an
atterrpt to raise the experimentally lowered self-concept

back to a chronic level.
The present finding that anti-social action

m.ay

lead to pro-social action confirms a relationship which

already had been established by other studies (e.g.

Darlington and Macker, I966; Berscheid and V/alster,
1967).

Depending upon the particular orientation of

the theorist or researcher, the labels which have been

applied to the uncomif or table cognitive state which
typically follows anti-social behavior include guilt,
dissonance, regret, etc.

Up to nov;, a behavioral rela-

tionship based upon the alleviation of an uncomif ort able

cognitive state had been established.

research goes one step further.

The present

The results of the

present study indicate that the probable source of the

uncomTortalble state is

a

decrease in one’s position

along the benevolence dirrension of the self-concept.

78

The subsequent pro-soolal action
raises the self-concept
back to the chronic level and the
unco rfortable copjiltlve

state is alleviated.
1

Ihe results of the present study sup;gest
that any

given pro-social or anti-social act may be
accounted
for in terms of any one of three processes.

First, it

nay i*epresent an atteirpt to restore a negatively
or

positively shifted self-concept back to its chronic
level.

Second, it may represent forced-compliance

behavior which results in a positive or negative shift

along the benevolence dimension of the self-concept.
Third, it nay represent nornal activity for that indi-

vidual’s chronic self-concept level.

In order to deter-

mine which of these processes is responsible for the

pro-social or anti-social action, lU would be necessary
to analyze the individual's behavior which preceded the

act, and the effect which the preceding behavior had
on the individual's self-concept.
m.ay

The observed behavior

or nay not affect subsequent behavior depending

upon which of the three processes is responsible for
the pro-social or anti-social action.

Suggestions for Further Research

Although the present findings do not suggest any
specific llnitations of the homeostatic model, the
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nature of the experirrcntal settinp
must be taken into
account when one attenpts to generalize
from these
findings.
It must be remembered that the
negative
displacement manipulation employed in the present
study
was the product of a request by a legitimate
authority
(the experimenter).

Similarly, the anti-social action

which took place within the laboratory was also
at the
request of legitimate authority and was directed toward
an experimenter’s assistant who probably had full knowl-

edge of the consequences of his job and was probably

paid for his efforts.

suggest two questions.

These experimental conditions

What is the precise nature of

behaviors which will cause a displacement along the
self"-concept level, and, what factors determine who

will be the target of behavioral restoration?
The findings also suggested that, under certain

conditions, the restoration process will take a behavioral form, under other conditions, cognitive processes

will be utilized, or finally, the self-concept level
will remain shifted (as in the D+/NI and the D-/NI

conditions).

Although the present findings suggested

that situational factors play an important role in deter-

mining the restoration
be specified.

rrode,

these factors have yet to

Perhaps personality variables by them-

selves or interacting with situational variables also

80

have an effect on the means by which
restoration will
take place.
In the present study, the D-/HARM subjects
and the

D+/HLLP subjects acco nplished restoration without
yielding any supporting behavioral or copjiitive data. It is
suppested, that in future studies, additional cof^nitive

data be obtained.

Specifically, data concerning; the

subj ects perceptions of the displacement manipulations
'

should be obtained both

before and after the subjects

have been g-iven an opportunity for behavioral restoration

.

Once these questions are ansv-zered and the linitations of the homeostatic model are known, questions of
a

nore

general nature may be asked.

If the honeostatic

model is indeed valid, can certain child rearing prac-

tices be modified as to lessen nan’s propensity to

engage in anti-social action?

Can the homeostatic

model together with a construct such as "collective

self-concept" account for such nass phenomena as riots,
lynchings, or even, war?
The major contribution of the present research
is that

it

provides a new approach to the study of

pro-social and anti-social action.

However, until

additional research is conducted, and the limitations
of the homeostatic model are realized, it is difficult

o

assess its full iirpllcati

,
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APPENDIX

Self-Concept Test
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The purpose of this test is to find out
how you perceive yourself in relation to a number of
personality

dimensions.

Your task will be to rate yourself on 25

personality dimensions.

Each personality dimension is

represented by a scale which is divided into

9

equal

spaces.

You are to put a check-mark in one of these

spaces.

Your placement of the checkmark depends on how

9

similar you feel you are to other university students

along the different dimensions.

As an exairple, let's

take the dimension "Happy."
"Happy"

Above

Avera^

::::::::::
12 3^5^?F"9

Below
Average

Avera ge

Notice that the fifth space is marked "Average."

This

space represents how happy the average university student
feels he is.

If you felt that you were about as happy as

the average university student, you would check this space.
If you felt that you v/ere sli pht ly more happy than the

average university student, you would check space ^4.

If

you felt that you were somewhat more happy than the average university student, you would check space ^3*

If you

felt that you were considerably more happy than the average

university student, you would check space H2,

If you felt

that you were extremely more happy than the average
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university student, you would check
space #1.

a space

to the right of the "Average"
space would be checked if
you felt that you were less happy
than the average uni-

versity student.

If you felt that you were slightly

less happy than the average university
student, you would

check space #G.

If you felt that you were somewhat less

happy that the average university student,
you would check
space #7.
if you felt that were considerably less happy
than the average university student, you would
check

space ^8.

If you felt that you were e xtremely less happy

than the average university student, you would check
space ^9.

Remember, you are conparing yourself to the average

university student.

So, if you felt that you were an

extremely happy person but also that the average university student were an extremely happy person, you v/ould

check space number

5

since you are no more or less happy

than the average university student.

Take your time.
ately as possible.

Try to perform this task as accur-

Place your check-marks in the middle

of the spaces chosen and not on the lines
the spaces.

•

that separate

"
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"Adaptable"

Above
Average

-

-

•

•

--

j

1

~<r
Average

•

~r

«

~T

Below
Average

"Bold"

Above
Avera ge

—

"TT
“T"
Average

T“

T"

T

Below
Average

"Assertive

Above
Average
2

~1>

n

5

^‘“7 “*“^’“^“'

Below
Average

Average

"Inquisitive"

Above
Average

Be lov;

Average

Average

"Intelligent"

Above
Average

12

3

~T~ 5
Average

7

“8“

Below
Average
9

"Kind"

Above
Average

:::::::::
12
3

~T' 5 “8“
Average

7

Below
Average

9

"Modern"

Below
Average

Above
Average
Average
"Tense"

Below
Average

Above
Average
Average
"Opti mist ic"

Below
Average

Above
Average
Average

"Active”

Above
Average
1

2

— —
-5-

"TT

3
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-g-'-g-

Below
Avera ge

Average

"Creative"

Above
Average

*

•

1

*

Below
Average

*

2

8

9

Average
"Neat"

Above
Average
2

3

~r 5~5

7

8

Below
Average
9

Average
"Liberal"
Above
Average
1

2

—

T ~TTAverage

—

B“

T

Below
Average

"Merciful"

Above
Average

T~

~T

~

Below
Average

-f

Average
"Efficient"

Above
Average

123

“8“
Average
5

"Trust In

Below
Average
7

9

g"

Above
Average

Belov:

Average

Average

"Practical"

Above
Average

*1*2*3

“8“
Average
5

Below
Average
7

9

"Discreet"

Above
Average

::::::::::
~ ~
~r
~2~

9

Average

Below
Average

"Careful"

Above
Average

~

90

Below
Average

"~2

Average
"Selfish"

Above
Average

T" "F"
Average
"

Above
Average

*

1

2

*

3

Below
Average

T

Lucky"
•

•

Below
Average

•

^

Average
"Ori ginal"

Above
Average

Below
Average

T" ~TAverage
"Secure"

Above
Average

•

•

“I

•

2

3

•

*

,

,

,

Below
Average

^
5
Average
"Boring"

Above
Average

12

Below
Average
3

"T" 5 “F“
Average

7

9

"Attractive"

Below
Average

Above
Average
Average

Post-ETOerlnental Questionnaire

s

Please answer the following; questions care
fully

92

Do you think this expcrinent has scientific
value?

1.

I Think This
Ejqjerinent Has

Much Scientific
Value

2,

Did you enjoy participating in this experiment?

I Enjoyed It
Very Much

3.

Think I Was
Extremely
Helpful

Think The
Experimenter Was
Very Pleased

Don't Think
Was At All
Helpful
I
I

Don't Think The
Experimenter Was
At All Pleased
I

Do you think that the experimenter's assistant enjoyed
participatinp in this experiment?

Think He
Enjoyed It
Very Much
I

6.

It At All

Do you think the experimenter was pleased with your
performance as a subject?

I

5.

Did Not Enjoy

I

Do you think you were helpful in providinp the ejqjerimenter with suitable data?

I

.

Don't Think This
Experinent Has
Any Scientific
Value
I

I

Don't Think

He Enjoyed It
At All

Do you think that you were kind to the

e xperi renter'

assistant?

Think
I Was
Very Kind
I

Don't Think
Was At All
Kind

I

I

